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I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless fidelity ("Wi-Fi") technology brings the Internet anywhere
that a radio signal can reach.' Transmitting radio signals beyond the
confines of walls, fences, and property lines, Wi-Fi technology delivers
newfound convenience to a person who operates a wireless computer
network ("Wi-Fi operator"). 2 This convenience, however, has given
rise to an unintended externality. Persons whom the Wi-Fi operator
never intended to receive the transmission may realize full Internet
access at the operator's expense. 3 A Wi-Fi operator pays $29.95 each
month for Internet service;4 the operator's next-door neighbor reaps
that same service for free.5 In the lexicon of cyber speech, this phe-
nomenon is appropriately referred to as "joyriding."6 Joyriding can
cause substantial delays in data transmission, 7 and it can facilitate
the diffusion of harmful viruses to all computers within the wireless
network.8 Yet despite these possible harms, Wi-Fi operators often do
1. See Wi-Fi Alliance, The How and Why ofWiFi, http://www.wi-fi.org/OpenSection/
why Wi-Fi.asp?TID=2#Wi-FiConnects_YouAnywhere (last visited May 15,
2006) [hereinafter How and Why of WiFi] (describing advantages of Wi-Fi
technology).
2. See Benjamin D. Kern, Whacking, Joyriding and War-Driving: Roaming Use of
Wi-Fi and the Law, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 103
(2004).
3. Id. at 104.
4. See, e.g., AT&T Residential: Internet Services, httpJ/www.consumer.att.com/
plans/internet/ (last visited May 15, 2006) (offering monthly DSL service for
$29.95).
5. See Kern, supra note 2, at 109.
6. Id. at 104.
7. Robert V. Hale II, Wi-Fi Liability: Potential Legal Risks in Accessing and Operat-
ing Wireless Internet, 21 SANrA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 543, 552
(2004); Matt Hines, Worried About Wi-Fi Security?, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 19,
2005, http://news.com.com/Worried+about+Wi-Fi§ecurity/2100-7347_3-
5540969.html.
8. See Henry Kumagai, Mobile Technology Security Considerations, TECHSOUP.ORG,
June 16, 2004, http://www.techsoup.org/howto/articlepage.cfm?Articleld=552&
topicid=4 ("Two recently unleashed worms, Sasser and Korgo, infect one com-
puter and then start looking for other networked computers close by to attack.").
This Article contemplates only harms that usually occur unintentionally, such
as the two described above. Nevertheless, other harms are possible. Those in-
clude accessing private information from a Wi-Fi operator's computer, such as
credit-card or bank-account numbers. See Alex Leary, Wi-Fi Cloaks a New Breed
of Intruder, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 1A, available at http'/
www.sptimes.com/2005/07/04/news-pf/State/Wi-Fi cloaks-a-newjbr.shtml. An-
other harm could occur where a joyriding neighbor causes a Wi-Fi operator to
suffer disrepute. If a joyriding neighbor commits criminal acts over the Internet,
those acts are traced back to the Wi-Fi operator. Id. This is so because each
online connection produces an Internet Protocol ("IP") address, which is a unique
numerical combination that can be traced to the physical place where the In-
ternet connection is set up. Id. Hence, a joyriding neighbor's activities on the
Internet can be traced back to the Wi-Fi operator. Id. In one instance, an e-mail
1227
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not password protect their networks. 9 Joyriding has thus become
common practice.1O The law should intervene."
The question of whether the common law permits a neighbor to
joyride on a wireless network presents novel and complex issues of
tort and property law.12 At first glance, it seems that the joyriding
neighbor does not invade any legally protected interest of the Wi-Fi
operator, even though the Wi-Fi operator may suffer negative exter-
nalities.13 Tort law does not appear to protect a Wi-Fi operator's in-
terest in the wireless network because a wireless network comprises
radio signals.1 4 Radio signals are uncontrollable by nature, and
thereby cannot be property.15 Absent property, trespass cannot lie.' 6
containing death threats was sent to a school principal. Id. The IP address lead
investigators to a dumbfounded family that had been operating a wireless In-
ternet connection. Id. As it turned out, a neighborhood boy had tapped into their
wireless network and sent the e-mail. Id.
9. See Hale, supra note 7, at 547; Kern, supra note 2, at 104; Steve Hargreaves,
Stealing Your Neighbor's Net, MONEY, Aug. 10, 2005, at 21, available at httpj/
money.cnn.com/2005/08/08/technology/personaltech/interneLpiracy/in-
dex.htm?cnn=yes (opining that Internet joyriding is becoming a common phenom-
enon); Leary, supra note 8, at 1A (commenting that experts believe that scores of
joyriding incidents occur undetected, and that many people do not take the time
to secure their wireless Internet connections).
10. See Hale, supra note 7, at 547 (reporting that sixty-seven percent of wireless
users do not implement security measures); Kern, supra note 2, at 109 ("A roam-
ing Wi-Fi user obtains broadband Internet access service, a valuable service,
without paying compensation."); Leary, supra note 8, at 1A.
11. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
12. See discussion infra Parts III, IV. Other commentators have considered whether
the conduct violates state and federal statutes specifically directed at prohibiting
certain forms of computer activity. See Hale, supra note 7, at 544-52 (analyzing
whether the conduct violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 and the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act); Kern, supra note 2, at 120-51 (analyz-
ing whether the conduct violates the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Communications Act of 1934, and
various state statutes prohibiting unauthorized access to computer systems).
They have concluded that the conduct should not be viewed as violating these
statutes. See Hale, supra note 7, at 544-52; Kern, supra note 2, at 120-51. This
Article does not consider federal and state statutes that could arguably apply to
the conduct. Rather, this Article considers only whether the common law applies.
13. An analogous example of a neighbor harming the adjacent landowner but not
violating any legally protected interest might occur if the neighbor were to con-
struct an unsightly edifice which had a negative effect on surrounding property
values. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 32 (1998) [A] building or structure generally can-
not be complained of as a nuisance merely because it interferes with the passage
of light and air to adjoining premises, regardless of the impact on the injured
party's property or person."); see also, e.g., Sher v. Leiderman, 226 Cal. Rptr. 698,
701-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that landowners could not recover in tort
against neighbor for harm caused to landowner's property in the form of sunlight
blockage).
14. See How and Why of WiFi, supra note 1.
15. Energy that cannot be controlled cannot be possessed. See BLAciKs LAw DICTION-
ARY 1201 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "possession" to mean "[tihe right under which
[Vol. 84:12261228
20061 PHYSICAL TRESPASS IN VIRTUAL REALITY
Even if wireless networks were recognized as property, the neigh-
bor's conduct is arguably permissible. Where the Wi-Fi operator has
failed to set up a password, the operator seems to implicitly consent to
sharing Internet access. 17 The Wi-Fi operator seems to consent to joy-
riding.1 Furthermore, the common law permits a neighbor to use
property that crosses onto and interferes with the neighbor's air-
space.19 The Wi-Fi radio signals cross over to the neighbor's land, po-
tentially interfering with the neighbor's airspace, so the common law
may protect the neighbor's conduct. 20 Finally, social policy seems to
support the position of the joyriding neighbor. The Internet is a public
good, and the law should support any means of allowing as many per-
sons to access it.21 To that end, it is arguable that Wi-Fi radio signals,
which travel over government-regulated frequencies,2 2 should not be
subject to private ownership. Wi-Fi signals should arguably be
treated as part of a public commons available for anyone's use.23
Despite these arguments against finding a trespass, recent caselaw
dealing with the Internet suggests otherwise. Courts are quickly
remolding the age-old trespass-to-chattel doctrine so that it fits the
new medium of cyberspace. 2 4 Albeit relatively young, Internet juris-
one may exercise control over something to the exclusion of all others"). It is
therefore incapable of being property. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the
Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1222, 1238 (1979) (defending the common law
proposition that "taking possession of unowned things is the only possible way to
acquire ownership of them").
16. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 1222 (commenting that the question of remedy for
trespass is posterior to the question of whether a person holds a protected prop-
erty right).
17. See discussion infra section IV.A.
18. See discussion infra section IV.A.
19. See Hickey v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., 55 N.W. 989, 990-91 (Mich. 1893); 66 C.J.S.
Nuisances § 87 (1998) ("It has been held that the person aggrieved may cut off
branches of a neighbor's trees overhanging his land, remove a part of an adjoin-
ing owner's wall which overhangs his premises, or cut off the eaves of a building
overhanging his property.").
20. See discussion infra section IV.B.
21. See Kern, supra note 2, at 108-09 (arguing on policy grounds that people should
be permitted to access the Internet anywhere that Wi-Fi access points are
available).
22. Wi-Fi devices operate on the 2.4 and 5 GHz frequencies of the radio band. See
How and Why of WiFi, supra note 1. The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") has designated that users of these frequencies do not need a government-
issued license. See generally 47 C.F.R. § 15 (2004).
23. See Kern, supra note 2, at 108-09.
24. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D.
Cal. 2000) (ruling that plaintiff was entitled to preliminary injunctive relief be-
cause there was a strong likelihood that plaintiff would prevail at trial on a tres-
pass to chattels claim based on defendant's use of plaintiffs website);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-27 (S.D.
Ohio 1997) (ruling that plaintiff was entitled to preliminary injunctive relief be-
cause there was a strong likelihood that plaintiff would prevail at trial on a tres-
1229
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prudence has espoused the view that electronic signals sent through
cyberspace to a physical object may give rise to contact that is trespas-
sory in nature. 25 Applying this new doctrine to the Wi-Fi context
reveals that a joyriding neighbor likely trespasses when the neighbor
sends electronic signals to the Wi-Fi operator's device that transmits
data through the Internet-a Wi-Fi router.26 Whereas Wi-Fi radio
signals are not property, the Wi-Fi router indisputably is. It is a phys-
ical object that remains in the possession and control of the Wi-Fi op-
erator.2 7 Under the reasoning of Internet caselaw, the joyriding
neighbor appears to "intermeddle" with the router when the neighbor
sends electronic signals through it.28 Because the router is the prop-
erty under consideration-rather than Wi-Fi radio signals-the fact
that a joyriding neighbor uses Wi-Fi radio signals which cross over to
the neighbor's land is of no consequence. 29 Trespassory contact ap-
pears to occur at the router.
Policy also implies a trespass. The transaction costs of joyriding-
the possibility of computer viruses and transmission delays-out-
weigh the benefit of permitting joyriding neighbors free access to the
Internet. 30 In short, joyriding can impose costly consequences on the
unsuspecting Wi-Fi operator. 3 1 Moreover, even if these transaction
costs did not exist, the joyriding neighbor strips Internet service prov-
iders ("ISPs") of economic returns.32 It is likely that some joyriding
neighbors value Internet access at a level sufficiently high such that
they would subscribe to ISP services were joyriding unavailable.3 3 To
realize a full return on their investment in Internet technology, ISPs
must receive payment for their services by anyone who uses it. Pro-
pass to chattels claim based on defendant's use of plaintiffs computer equipment
to send unsolicited mass e-mails).
25. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021 ("Electronic signals generated and sent by
computer have been held to be sufficiently physically tangible to support a tres-
pass cause of action." (relying on Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d
468, 473 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that electronic signals that defendants
had generated to access a phone system were "sufficiently tangible to support a
trespass cause of action"))).
26. See Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069 ("[It appears likely that the electronic
signals sent by [the defendant] to retrieve information from eBay's computer sys-
tem are also sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause of action."); Com-
puServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1021-22.
27. See How and Why of Wi-Fi, supra note 1.
28. See discussion infra subsection III.B.1.
29. See discussion infra subsection III.B.1.
30. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.
31. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.
32. See Kern, supra note 2, at 110 (discussing the detrimental effect that free-riding
users of a wireless network have on the capacity and infrastructure of an ISP).
33. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.
1230 [Vol. 84:1226
2006] PHYSICAL TRESPASS IN VIRTUAL REALITY 1231
tection of Internet investments favors viewing the neighbor's conduct
as a trespass. 34
This Article addresses the question of whether the joyriding neigh-
bor commits an actionable trespass against the Wi-Fi operator. Part
II explains how a wireless network functions, and how a neighbor is
able to access that network. Part III examines whether the neighbor's
conduct satisfies the elements of trespass to chattel, identifying the
chattel at issue as the Wi-Fi router. Part III concludes that the neigh-
bor's conduct satisfies the elements of trespass to chattel. Part IV ex-
amines the defenses to trespass to chattel, addressing whether
joyriding is permissible when a Wi-Fi operator has not password pro-
tected the network or when the Wi-Fi operator's network interferes
with the neighbor's ability to set up his or her own wireless network.
Part IV concludes that neither the absence of password protection nor
the presence of Wi-Fi interference should be a defense to the tortious
conduct.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A wireless network allows computers within a local geographic
area to share information without being connected by wires. 3 5 Radio
signals make Wi-Fi technology possible.36 Wi-Fi radio signals origi-
nate from a device called a Wi-Fi router.3 7 The Wi-Fi router transmits
data between computers within the network, and between a modem
that is connected to the Internet and a computer within the net-
work. 38 In effect, the Wi-Fi router serves as a hub for information
exchange between computers within the network and between any
network computer and the Internet.39
Wi-Fi routers operate on frequencies that the government has per-
mitted consumers to use without licenses. Baby monitors, cordless
phones, microwave ovens, Bluetooth devices,40 and other wireless de-
34. See discussion infra subsection III.B.2.
35. Kern, supra note 2, at 103.
36. See How and Why of Wi-Fi, supra note 1.
37. See Hewlett Packard, Introduction to Wireless, http://h71036.www7.hp.com/hho/
cache/6588-0-0-225-121.html (last visited May 15, 2006) (describing function of
wireless router as a bridge that allows interconnectivity among computers that
facilitates sharing of an Internet connection); Bradley Mitchell, Wireless Product
Equipment-Network Routers, Access Points, Adapters and More, http:fl
compnetworking.about.com/od/wireless/ss/wirelessgear.htm (last visited May 15,
2006) (explaining the role of wireless routers in a wireless network).
38. See sources cited supra note 37.
39. See sources cited supra note 37.
40. The term "Bluetooth" represents a trade association, Bluetooth SIG, that has de-
veloped specifications for testing the quality of wireless devices. Bluetooth,
Trademark Information, http:/Avww.bluetooth.com/Bluetooth/SIG/Trademark/
(last visited May 15, 2006). For a fee, Bluetooth will endorse devices that pass its
quality test. Bluetooth, Membership Overview, http://www.bluetooth.com/
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vices all operate on the same unlicensed frequencies as Wi-Fi rout-
ers.4 1 To prevent wireless devices from interfering with one another,
the frequencies have multiple channels on which a single wireless de-
vice can operate. 4 2 Most wireless devices will "listen" for a clear chan-
nel before becoming active.43 Thus, a wireless network can experience
interference, but technological advances are decreasing instances of
such interference.
The range of a Wi-Fi router's signal varies according to its strength
in relation to physical obstructions.44 On average, routers can relia-
bly transmit signals over a range of about 300 feet, approximately the
size of a football field.45 Physical objects cannot usually impede Wi-Fi
radio signals anywhere within this range.4 6 Hence, data transmission
is possible between computers in separate rooms, or even in different
buildings.47
The strength of Wi-Fi radio signals allows a neighbor of a Wi-Fi
operator to access the wireless network48 The neighbor need merely
install a wireless network adapter on a computer and place the com-
puter within the range of the Wi-Fi operator's router. 49 After the
wireless network adapter is installed on the neighbor's computer, the
computer can receive Wi-Fi radio signals.50 When the computer lo-
cates a Wi-Fi signal, it displays a prompt on its screen, querying the
neighbor whether the computer should interface with the wireless net-
Bluetooth/SIG/Membership/ (last visited May 15, 2006). Examples of Bluetooth-
endorsed products include keyboards, mice, palm pilots, and mobile phones.
Bluetooth, Product Directory, http://www.bluetooth.com/Bluetooth/Connect/Prod-
ucts/ (last visited May 15, 2006).
41. Christopher W. Klaus, Wireless LAN 802.11b Security FAQ, http://www.iss.net/
wireless/WLANFAQ.php (last visited May 15, 2006) ("Cordless phones, baby
monitors, and other devices like Bluetooth that operate on the 2.4 GHz frequency
can disrupt a wireless network.").
42. See Cisco Systems, Inc., Linksys White Papers: What Wireless Networking
Means to Everyday People, at 7 (on file with author) [hereinafter Linksys White
Paper].
43. Id.
44. Id. at 6-7
45. Kern, supra note 2, at 103. It is noteworthy that the 300-foot range of home
wireless networks does not reflect the limits of technology. Using the proper an-
tenna, a person could receive Wi-Fi radio signals as far away as a mile from the
transmitting router. Wi-Fi Alliance, Range & Environment Issues, httpj/fwi-
fi.org/OpenSection/range.asp?TID=2 (last visited May 15, 2006); accord Hines,
supra note 7 (stating that with a special amplification device, a person could re-
ceive Wi-Fi radio signals as far away as seventy-two miles).
46. See Linksys White Paper, supra note 42, at 6-7.
47. See Hale, supra note 7, at 543-44.
48. Kern, supra note 2, at 104.
49. See id. at 103; Linksys White Paper, supra note 42, at 6; Mitchell, supra note 37.
50. See Jim Harrington, Linksys: Antenna Basics, (Nov. 19, 2001), at 2-6 (on file
with author) (explaining how computer antennas function); Mitchell, supra note
37.
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work.51 Selecting "OK" connects the neighbor's computer to the In-
ternet through the wireless network. 5 2 A neighbor might view
websites, check e-mail, download files, file share, or media stream.5 3
Any of these practices constitutes "joyriding."54 It is noteworthy that
while joyriding, a neighbor may unintentionally transmit an elec-
tronic virus to computers within the wireless network.55 That is, a
virus can pass from the neighbor's computer, through the router, to
the operator's computer-even where the neighbor does not access the
operator's computer, but merely accesses the Internet through the Wi-
Fi connection. 5 6 In the absence of specialized software that many Wi-
Fi operators are not likely aware of, viruses within a network can
spread uninhibited from computer to computer.5 7
A Wi-Fi operator often does not know when someone is joyriding on
the wireless network.58 If a joyriding neighbor only surfs the web or
checks e-mail, the Wi-Fi operator's rate of data transmission to and
from the Internet is not noticeably slower than if the neighbor were
not using the wireless network.59 On the other hand, if the neighbor
downloads large files from the Internet, or engages in file-sharing or
media-streaming, the neighbor will tax the router's resources.6 0 A Wi-
Fi operator would notice a delay in the transmission speed.61 Never-
theless, even where there is such a delay, there is no immediate indi-
cation to the Wi-Fi operator that the neighbor has accessed the
51. See Hale, supra note 7, at 543.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 552-54.
54. Kern, supra note 2, at 104.
55. See Kumagai, supra note 8.
56. This type of virus transmission is possible through a process called "port scan-
ning." See Gary C. Kessler, Port Scanning: It's Not Just an Offensive Tool Any-
more (May 2001), www.garykessler.net/library/is-toolsscan.html. A computer
connected to a network may contain a "port scanner" virus. A "port scanner"
would probe the network, through the network's unique IP address, to determine
which other computers are connected to that network. See id. After probing the
network, the port scanner would search for software on the network computers
vulnerable to virus attacks. See id.
57. See Hines, supra note 7. It should be noted that a computer firewall that blocks
virus transmission from sources on the Internet does not block viruses from
sources within the network. See id. (advocating computer users purchase special-
ized firewalls for protection from virus dissemination within a network); Jeff Ty-
son, How Firewalls Work, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/firewall.htm/
printable (last visited May 15, 2006) ("A firewall is simply a program or hardware
device that filters the information coming through the Internet connection into
your private network or computer system.").
58. See Kern, supra note 2, at 104.
59. Hale, supra note 7, at 554.
60. Id. at 552-53.
61. Id.
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wireless network.6 2 The Wi-Fi operator would experience a transmis-
sion delay, but would not know the source of that delay.6 3
Wi-Fi operators can prevent joyriding by simply setting up a pass-
word that users must provide to access the wireless network. 64 How-
ever, most Wi-Fi operators do not invoke such security measures.6 5 It
is therefore likely that most instances of joyriding do not consist of
"hacking" into a password-protected wireless network. For the pur-
poses of this Article, "joyriding" refers to the unauthorized access of a
wireless network, which is not password protected, for the sole pur-
pose of engaging in Internet activity.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF TRESPASS TO CHATTEL APPLIED
TO WI-FI JOYRIDING
This Part examines whether the joyriding neighbor's conduct gives
rise to a claim of trespass to chattel.66 A trespass to chattel lies where
62. See Kern, supra note 2, at 104. It should be noted that software programs exist
which would enable a Wi-Fi operator to be aware of another person accessing the
network. See, e.g., IBM Tivoli Monitoring, http://www-306.ibm.com/software/tiv-
olilproducts/monitor/?CVM=no (last visited May 15, 2006) (describing network-
monitoring software).
63. See Kern, supra note 2, at 104.
64. See Hale, supra note 7, at 546-47.
65. In 2003, an estimated sixty-seven percent of Wi-Fi operators did not enable se-
curity measures. Id. at 547. By 2007, it is estimated that nearly eighty percent
of wireless networks will be unsecured. Id.
66. This Article does not consider whether joyriding gives rise to claims of trespass to
land or nuisance. A brief analysis of these issues, however, reveals that neither
tort applies. An argument that the joyriding neighbor commits a trespass to land
relies on the premise that the Wi-Fi radio signals which the neighbor transmits
to the Wi-Fi router constitute an actionable intrusion on the Wi-Fi operator's
land. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 158 cmt. i, at 278 (1958) (stating that an
actor may trespass to land by throwing, propelling, or placing a thing in the air
space above the land). This premise is untenable because the radio signals oper-
ate on bandwidth frequencies that the FCC has designated as "unlicensed." See
supra note 22. A person has no right to exclude another from using one of the
unlicensed frequencies, even where the frequency lies within the geographic
boundary of the person's land. For instance, the interference that a baby monitor
causes to an adjacent landowner's cordless phone does not result in a trespass to
land.
With regard to the tort of nuisance, it is well established that federal law
preempts a nuisance claim based on radio-signal interference. See Broyde v. Go-
tham Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that enforcement
of a nuisance claim based on radio-signal interference would contravene the doc-
trine of preemption, frustrating the objectives of the Federal Communications
Act); Goforth v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 579, 584-85 (Ark. 1999) (ruling that the FCC
has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving radio-interference nuisance
claims); Still v. Michaels, 803 P.2d 124, 124-25 (Ariz. 1990) (same); Blackburn v.
Doubleday Broad. Co., 353 N.W.2d 550, 555-57 (Minn. 1984) (same). Nuisance
does not apply. With regard to the governing federal law, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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an actor intentionally dispossesses another of a chattel, or alterna-
tively, uses or intermeddles with a chattel in possession of another. 6 7
Section III.A considers the possible chattel on which the joyriding
neighbor allegedly trespasses. Section III.B analyzes whether the
neighbor's conduct is trespassory in nature. A discussion of the possi-
ble defenses to trespass to chattel follows in Part IV.
A. The Chattel
Trespass to chattel requires that a chattel exist.68 If the joyriding
neighbor commits a trespass to chattel against the Wi-Fi operator, the
Wi-Fi operator must own a "thing" on which a trespass can be commit-
ted.6 9 At first glance, the "thing" to be considered in the trespass
analysis seems to be the wireless network.70 As discussed below, how-
ever, a wireless network does not possess characteristics of property
which are necessary for ownership. Therefore the "thing" to be consid-
ered in the trespass analysis should not be the wireless network; in-
stead, for reasons discussed below, the "thing" should be the Wi-Fi
router.
The view that the wireless network is a chattel against which a
trespass may be committed essentially posits that a Wi-Fi operator
should be rewarded for laboring to create the network.7 1 It is the Wi-
Fi operator who purchases and installs a router that makes the net-
work even possible. On the basis that laborers should hold property
rights in the fruits of their labors, the Wi-Fi operator arguably should
own the radio signals that the Wi-Fi router transmits.72 The Wi-Fi
operator is, in effect, the creator of the transmission. As the creator,
67. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217, at 417.
68. See Epstein, supra note 15, at 1222 (commenting that the question of remedy for
trespass is posterior to the question of whether a person holds a protected prop-
erty right).
69. See id.
70. See Kern, supra note 2, at 152 (considering the argument that a joyriding neigh-
bor commits a trespass to chattel with respect to the Wi-Fi operator's "network");
Jason M. Kueser, Note, This Lan Is My Lan, This Lan Is Your Lan: The Case for
Extending Private Property Rights to Wireless Local Area Networks, 72 UMKC L.
REV. 787, 797-98 (2004) (arguing that the radio signals that a wireless network
transmits are property).
71. Kueser, supra note 70, at 798. This argument stems from John Locke's labor
theory of property. According to Locke, property rights vest when a person mixes
his labor with a thing in a way "that excludes the common right of other Men."
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 306 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1967) (1690); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES
*405. In the Wi-Fi context, the data composing the Internet lie in public domain.
Arguably, the Wi-Fi operator labors to sever transmissions of that data from the
general commons by subscribing to an ISP service and by setting up a wireless
network. Under Locke's theory, then, the Wi-Fi user's labor creates for the Wi-Fi
user property rights in the wireless network.
72. See discussion supra note 71.
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the Wi-Fi operator seems to hold property rights over the creation-
the wireless network, or in other words, the Wi-Fi radio-signal
transmission. 73
This argument is unpersuasive. Although a person may expend
great labor to produce an outcome, that outcome does not necessarily
produce a thing to which property rights may attach.7 4 Property re-
quires exclusivity.7 5 Regardless of whether the subject of property is
tangible or not, that subject must be capable of exclusive control and
possession. 76 The wireless network is not capable of being exclusively
controlled or possessed because it includes radio signals.7 7 Radio sig-
nals cannot be contained within a geographic boundary. 78 Their only
boundary is their bandwidth frequencies, and those frequencies are
unlicensed, meaning that the government has permitted any person to
transmit signals over the frequencies.79 Coterminous use of the fre-
quencies is therefore permissible, which could produce interference
73. On three separate occasions, federal district courts have labeled a computer net-
work as the subject of property. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp.
2d 444, 452 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("The transmission of electrical signals through a
computer network is sufficiently 'physical' contact to constitute a trespass to prop-
erty.") (emphasis added); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D.
Va. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-
20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (opining that "com-
puter networks" comprising an e-mail system can be personal property). As one
commentator has noted, however, where courts have found aspects of computer
accessing to be property, their analysis appears to have been driven by a results-
oriented outcome. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access"
and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596,
1610-11 (2003).
74. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The
primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors ....").
75. 73 C.J.S. Property § 7, at 9 (1998) ("[Ilt has been said that for a property right to
exist in something, there must be an interest capable of a precise definition, it
must be capable of exclusive possession or control, and the putative owner must
have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity."); see also JOHN E. CRIBBET ET
AL., PROPERTY 8 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., The Foundation Press 1996) (1960)
(commenting that exclusivity is a necessary criterion for an efficient system of
property rights).
76. For instance, property rights exist in intangible domain names because registra-
tion of a domain name excludes others from using it on the Internet. See Kremen
v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003).
77. See How and Why of WiFi, supra note 1 (stating that wireless networks operate
in the unlicensed 2.4 and 5 GHz bandwidths).
78. An argument could be made that Wi-Fi radio signals can be contained within a
physical boundary. A company called Force Field Wireless has developed, and
sells, paint that, according to the company, bars the passage of radio signals. See
Force Field Wireless, http://www.forcefieldwireless.com/defendair.html (last vis-
ited May 15, 2006). Apparently the paint is laced with copper and aluminum,
both of which form an electromagnetic shield. Hines, supra note 7. Unfortu-
nately the paint comes in only one color-gray. Id.
79. See supra note 22.
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between competing signals.8 0 A Wi-Fi operator cannot exclude an-
other person from using a frequency, meaning that a Wi-Fi operator
cannot exclude another person from interfering with Wi-Fi radio sig-
nals.8 ' In short, Wi-Fi radio signals do not admit exclusivity, so they
should not be viewed as property.8 2
It should be noted that the capability to password protect a wire-
less network does not satisfy the exclusivity requirement of property.
Although a Wi-Fi operator can password protect the wireless network
against unwanted use, the Wi-Fi operator cannot preclude another
person from interfering with the Wi-Fi radio signals.8 3 The fact that
interference is possible, and moreover permissible,8 4 demonstrates
that a Wi-Fi operator is unable to exercise exclusive control and pos-
session over the Wi-Fi radio signals. The password protects another
person from interpreting Wi-Fi signals, but not from interfering with
the signals. Password protection does not imply that the operator can
exclude others from interfering with the Wi-Fi radio signals. They
are not property.
Although the radio signals composing the network are not prop-
erty, a physical piece of equipment that makes possible the network
indisputably is. The router-the network component through which
Wi-Fi radio signals are transmitted-is property.8 5 Unlike radio sig-
nals which are incapable of exclusive control and possession, the Wi-Fi
router is continually in the control and possession of the Wi-Fi opera-
tor. Even during the neighbor's joyriding, the router remains physi-
cally with the Wi-Fi operator. The Wi-Fi operator therefore holds an
undisputable property interest in the router. The question of trespass
is thus whether the neighbor's use of the router constitutes a violation
of the Wi-Fi operator's property rights in the router.
80. Linksys White Paper, supra note 42, at 6.
81. The fact that a wireless-device user cannot prohibit radio interference on an unli-
censed frequency is consistent with the fact that a wireless-device user can pro-
hibit a person from employing the frequency as a means to harm the user's
personal property. The former fact concerns interference on the frequency
bandwidth; the latter fact concerns personal property rights, independent of fre-
quency interference.
82. This fact is also manifested by Congress's express declaration with respect to li-
censed frequencies. See 47 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). But see CRIBBET ET AL., supra
note 75, at 9-10 (arguing that property rights exist in broadcast frequencies in at
least economic terms). If in fact licensed frequencies cannot be owned, it appears
certain that property rights do not attach to unlicensed frequencies either.
83. See Linksys White Paper, supra note 42, at 6.
84. Interference is "permissible" to the extent that the unlicensed frequencies are not
regulated by government. See supra note 22.
85. See sources cited supra note 37.
1237
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
B. The Trespass
"The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept."8 6 The tort of
trespass to chattel has lain dormant for years, having been employed
in times past to remedy farmers for injuries that were intentionally
inflicted on sheep and cattle.8 7 Recently, however, the tort has been
revived to deal with troubles in cyberspace.8 8 Courts have resurrected
the doctrine to prohibit the sending of unsolicited mass e-mails and
the searching of websites by robotic software. 89 Trespass to chattel
has served as a legal means for controlling traffic in cyberspace. Still
undetermined is the question of whether the tort's application to the
ontology of cyberspace encompasses Wi-Fi joyriding.9 0
An actionable trespass to chattel occurs when an actor intention-
ally either dispossesses another of a chattel, or alternatively, uses or
"intermeddles" with the chattel while it is in the possession of an-
other.9 1 In the context of Wi-Fi joyriding, the neighbor does not physi-
cally dispossess the Wi-Fi operator of the router. The neighbor uses
the router while it remains in the physical possession of the Wi-Fi op-
erator. Accordingly, the question of whether the neighbor trespasses
on the router involves an examination of whether the neighbor has
intentionally used or "intermeddled" with the router.
To use or intermeddle with a chattel, an actor must bring about
physical contact with the chattel.92 Physical contact may occur if the
actor physically touches the chattel, or if the actor causes something
else to touch the chattel. 93 A touching results in intermeddling.9 4 Yet
not all instances of intermeddling give rise to liability for trespass to
chattel.95 Liability arises only if the intermeddling causes harm. 96
Harm is manifest by an impairment of the chattel's condition, quality,
86. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 2.
87. Kern, supra note 2, at 151; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 14, at 85 (5th ed. 1984) (outlining the history of trespass
to chattel and stating that it was employed in situations where animals were
killed or beaten).
88. See, e.g., Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to
Chattels, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 421, 435-36 (2002) (explaining that courts have
employed the tort to deal with problems on the Internet); cases cited supra note
24.
89. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 24.
90. See Hale, supra note 7, at 552-55; Kern, supra note 2, at 151.
91. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217, at 417 (1958).
92. Id. § 217 cmt. e, at 419.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 218 cmt. e, at 421-22.
96. Id. § 218, at 420.
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or value. 97 In the absence of any of these conditions, the intermed-
dling is harmless, and thereby not actionable. 98
The following three subsections examine whether Wi-Fi joyriding
satisfies these requirements for trespass to chattel. Subsection III.B. 1
examines whether the neighbor's use of the Wi-Fi operator's router
results in physical contact sufficient to constitute intermeddling. Sub-
section III.B.2 examines whether the alleged contact results in harm.
Subsection III.B.3 examines whether the neighbor's use of the router
is intentional.
1. Physical Contact
Perhaps most intriguing about the Wi-Fi trespass argument is the
issue regarding whether a trespass is possible even though the neigh-
bor never causes a material object to physically contact the Wi-Fi
router. 99 The argument for trespass relies on the premise that the
neighbor causes physical contact with the router when the neighbor
transmits electronic signals through the router in order to access the
Internet.100 Although that premise has not yet been considered by
any court, courts have considered whether electronic signals satisfy
the physical-contact element in the context of Internet users sending
e-mail and accessing information on websites.1O1 As discussed below,
these e-mail and website cases suggest that Wi-Fi joyriding satisfies
the physical-contact element of trespass to chattel.
a. Jurisprudence Dealing with Physical Contact in
Cyberspace
Amidst public frustration with unsolicited mass e-mails, courts
have held that transmitting such e-mails constitutes a trespass to
chattel.' 0 2 The first instance occurred in CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc.103 There, the defendants sent unsolicited mass e-
97. Id.
98. Id. § 218 cmt. e, at 421-22. Although an actor is not liable for harmless inter-
meddling, a chattel owner may use reasonable force to halt such intermeddling.
Id.
99. Radio signals are not material objects, but rather are electrical and magnetic
fields. Harrington, supra note 50, at 2.
100. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217 cmt. e, at 419 (requiring physical contact for
trespassory intermeddling); Kern, supra note 2, at 151-52 (stating that a tres-
pass argument requires that the electronic signal be viewed as physical contact).
101. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 24.
102. See Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259, 1277
(N.D. Iowa 2000); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451-52 (E.D.
Va. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-
20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 1998).
103. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
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mails to subscribers of an ISP, CompuServe.1O4 The federal district
court held that the defendants had trespassed on CompuServe's com-
puter equipment, finding that the defendants had "intermeddled" with
the equipment. 0 5 In so holding, the court specifically held that the
electronic signals which the defendants had generated in order to send
the e-mail through CompuServe's computer equipment resulted in
physical contact. 0 6
Soon after CompuServe, trespass to chattel was routinely deployed
to cease the practice of mass e-mailing.O7 For instance, in America
Online, Inc. v. IMS,108 a federal district court relied exclusively on
CompuServe to find that the defendant had trespassed on an ISP's
property. As in CompuServe, the IMS court held that the electronic
signals that the defendants had sent as e-mails through the plaintiffs
computer equipment were sufficient to constitute a "contact" for pur-
poses of establishing trespassory intermeddling.i0 9 Following IMS,
the same federal district court faced the same issue in America On-
line, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc. 11o Without hesitation, the LCGM court de-
clared that "[t]he transmission of electrical signals through a
computer network is sufficiently 'physical' contact to constitute a tres-
pass to property."111 Thus, CompuServe's substantive alteration of an
age-old tort principle was readily accepted by courts. 1 2 Its rationale
continues to be deployed against defendants who send unsolicited
mass e-mails over the Internet." 3
Following the lead of these trespass-by-e-mail cases, courts applied
the doctrine of trespass to chattel as a means for precluding Internet
users from engaging automated software to collect data from web-
104. Id. at 1017.
105. Id. at 1027.
106. Id. at 1021. The CompuServe court relied on the reasoning of one case for this
finding-a California State Court decision, Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In Thrifty-Tel, children used software to con-
duct high-speed automated searches of possible access codes for a company's tele-
phone system. Id. at 471-72. The court held that the children had committed a
trespass to chattel. Id. at 473 n.6. According to the court, the electronic signals
composing the access codes were "sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause
of action." Id. The court reached this conclusion by relying on cases holding that
microscopic particles, such as dust and smoke, can constitute a trespass. Id. As
one commentator has pointed out, however, those cases on which Thrifty-Tel re-
lied dealt with trespass to land, not trespass to chattel. Dan L. Burk, The
Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 33 (2000).
107. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 102.
108. 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998).
109. Id. at 550.
110. 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998).
111. Id. at 452.
112. See cases cited supra note 102.
113. E.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1259,
1277 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
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sites. 114 In eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,115 the defendant, Bid-
der's Edge, executed a computer program, otherwise known as a "bot,"
to search and retrieve data from the website of the plaintiff, eBay.116
The court held that the electronic signals sent by Bidder's Edge
through the bot to eBay's server were "sufficiently tangible to support
a trespass cause of action.""1l Electronic signals satisfied the physi-
cal-contact requirement."l 8 Subsequently, in Register.com, Inc. v.
Verio, Inc. ,119 another federal district court ruled that searching web-
sites by using an automated software bot constituted a trespass to
chattel.120 The court did not even offer an explanation for the fact
that physical contact had occurred.' 2 1 The court's failure to address
this point suggests that it was so well established that it did not merit
discussion.
These cases adopt a rationale that electronic signals which interact
with physical components of computer equipment satisfy the physical-
contact requirement for trespass.12 2 Notable is the fact that physical
contact has been found in situations where the computer equipment
facilitates Internet communication. It appears that the intangible na-
ture of the Internet affects the physical-contact requirement of tres-
pass: where the alleged trespass occurs on the Internet, the contact
need not be with a physical object, but rather can be with an electronic
wave. Also notable is the fact that in cases where courts have held
that a trespass to chattel did not occur on the Internet, the courts have
not taken issue with the principle that electronic signals satisfy the
physical-contact requirement.123 Cyberspace jurisprudence thus ap-
pears to establish that electronic signals that contact a computer com-
ponent which facilitates Internet communication is sufficient to
satisfy the physical-contact requirement of trespass to chattel.124
114. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069-72 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
115. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
116. Id. at 1060, 1062.
117. Id. at 1069.
118. See id.
119. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
120. See id. at 245-50.
121. See id.
122. See Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1069-72; Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 550-51 (E.D. Va. 1998); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money
Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 1998).
123. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 303-04 (Cal. 1996); Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The
courts in Hamidi and Ticketmaster declined to find a trespass to chattel on the
basis that the electrical signal did not cause actionable harm. See Hamidi, 71
P.3d at 303-04; Ticketmaster, 2000 WL 1887522, at *4.
124. See cases cited supra note 123.
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Applying this principle to the Wi-Fi context reveals that the joyrid-
ing neighbor who sends electronic signals through the Wi-Fi router is
causing physical contact with the router. A Wi-Fi router is a physical
component of computer equipment that facilitates Internet communi-
cation.125 The reasoning of the cases described above implies that the
electronic signals that contact the router constitute physical contact
sufficient to support a finding of intermeddling.
b. Criticism of Physical Contact in Cyberspace
The view that physical contact occurs when an electronic signal
contacts a physical object is not without criticism. 12 6 The evident flaw
with the view is that a Wi-Fi electronic signal is not a material ob-
ject.1 27 It is a wave that travels through air. 128 If an electromagnetic
wave is capable of causing physical contact with a chattel, then other
forms of waves would be capable of causing physical contact. For ex-
ample, physical contact would result when a person directs an air fan
to blow air onto another's flag, yet this does not seem to be a tenable
example of trespassory physical contact. Consequently, the view that
Wi-Fi signals satisfy the physical-contact element of trespass to chat-
tel opens the door to situations where it would seem ridiculous to find
trespassory intermeddling.
One commentator has raised a similar criticism of the physical-
contact element in the context of Internet trespass cases. 129 Trespas-
sory physical contact over the Internet, according to the commentator,
gives rise to ridiculous implications.13o Unwanted telephone callers
send electronic signals to another's telephone, so they would commit a
trespass to chattel; the same could be said of people who transmit fac-
similes or television broadcasts.131 Electronic signals from baby
monitors which interfere with the operation of cordless telephones
would also result in trespass. Such bizarre results would seem to pre-
clude the conclusion that an electronic signal satisfies the physical-
contact requirement of trespass to chattel. 13 2
These criticisms would be well grounded if intermeddling were the
only element of an actionable trespass to chattel. Indeed, nearly every
device capable of producing airwaves or electronic signals would con-
stitute a means for committing a trespass to chattel. Such an outcome
cannot be. And it is not. As discussed above, trespassory intermed-
125. See Hewlett Packard, supra note 37 (describing function of wireless router).
126. See Burk, supra note 106, at 32-34.
127. See Harrington, supra note 50, at 2.
128. See id.
129. Burk, supra note 106, at 32-34.
130. Id. at 34.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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dling requires that the physical contact cause actionable harm, and
that the intermeddling be intentional.133 With respect to harm, the
seemingly "ridiculous" examples of airwaves and electronic signals
causing physical contact lack this necessary element. The lack of
harm in the airwave example is obvious: blowing airwaves onto a flag
does not damage the flag. However, if a person directed a powerful air
fan toward a lightweight vase that was precariously standing upright,
and in so doing caused the vase to blow over and break, then the air-
waves would be the means of committing actionable physical contact.
The same is true of electronic signals. A telephone caller causes elec-
tronic signals to contact another's telephone, but the signals do not
result in any damage to the telephone that is contacted.134 By con-
trast, if a person were to cause a power surge to short a cordless tele-
phone so that it was no longer operable, then the contact by the
electronic signals would have resulted in a trespass. An action for
trespass lies only if physical touching-by physical object, by airwave,
or by electronic signal-results in harm to the chattel.135
Intentionality must also exist for an intermeddling to be tor-
tious. 13 6 According to the Restatement, trespass to chattel does not lie
unless the actor acts "for the purpose of using or otherwise intermed-
dling with a chattel or with knowledge that such an intermeddling
will, to a substantial certainty, result from the act."13 7  In other
words, an actor must intend to contact the chattel at issue for trespass
to lie.13s Most instances where an electronic device interferes with
the performance of another electronic device are not likely intended.
For instance, parents do not usually intend for their baby monitors to
interfere with nearby cordless phones. An action for trespass would
133. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 217, at 417, 218 cmt. e, at 421-22 (1958); see also
discussion supra section III.B.
134. See Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 395 (Tex.
App. 2004) (refusing to recognize that an unsolicited fax resulted in a trespass to
chattel because the fax recipient sustained no actual damages).
It is noteworthy that even an obscenely offensive telephone call would not sat-
isfy the harm requirement for trespass to chattel. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71
P.3d 296, 308-09 (Cal. 1996) (rejecting argument that electrical signal can harm
recipient based on the content of the message sent via the signal).
135. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e, at 421-22; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 87, § 14, at 87. It should be noted that in circumstances where an
actor touches but does not harm a chattel, the chattel owner may use reasonable
force to halt the touching. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e, at 421-22. For
example, a car owner may remove a person who refuses to move from the owner's
car. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 14, at 87. In the context of elec-
tronic signals, then, a telephone owner may use reasonable force to protect her
phone from the electronic signals of an unwanted telephone call-she may hang
up on the caller.
136. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217, at 417.
137. Id. cmt. c, at 418.
138. See id.
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not lie. 139 On the other hand, if a person intentionally employed a
radio jammer to interfere with the signal of a cordless phone so that it
was inoperable, then a trespass would lie. Whereas the concerned
parent would never face liability for trespassing by baby monitor, the
radio jammer would. Wireless radio interference is usually uninten-
tional, preventing otherwise ridiculous instances of trespass.
In sum, the view that electronic signals and airwaves can be the
means of committing actionable physical contact appears sound. The
ridiculous examples that the above criticisms raise would never result
in liability for trespass. Just as patting another's horse or accidentally
tripping on another's cat does not result in actionable trespass,140
neither does blowing air on a flag, placing a telephone call, or interfer-
ing with a baby monitor. Trespassory liability requires harm and in-
tentional conduct.141 In conjunction with those elements, electronic
signals and airwaves can constitute means for trespassing on a
chattel.
2. Harm
a. Two Actionable Harms
As most wireless electronic signals do not result in actionable
harm, an issue arises as to whether the neighbor who joyrides on the
wireless network causes harm to the router of the Wi-Fi operator. To
satisfy the harm requirement, the physical contact must impair the
chattel's condition, quality, or value, or alternatively, the contact must
result in the owner being deprived of the chattel's use for a substantial
time period.142 Impairment must be actual rather than merely possi-
ble.143 In the Wi-Fi context, two harms are possible: (i) decreasing
router performance for the Wi-Fi operator; and (ii) transmitting com-
puter viruses through the router to the Wi-Fi operator's computer.' 4 4
139. See id. at 417.
140. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 14, at 87 (noting that patting a
horse does not result in trespass to chattel).
141. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 217, at 417, 218 cmt. e, at 421-22.
142. Id. § 218, at 420; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 14, at 87
(observing that harmless interference will not result in a trespass to chattel).
143. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e, at 421-22.
144. It is arguable that the neighbor unintentionally commits other harms against the
Wi-Fi operator. The Wi-Fi operator could be liable to an ISP for permitting a
third party to access the ISP's services without authorization. See Kerr, supra
note 73, at 1599-1600, 1637-39 (observing that courts have interpreted "unau-
thorized access" as occurring when a computer user accesses another's computer
network in violation of a contract between that other person and a third party).
In most contractual agreements with ISPs, Wi-Fi operators agree to restrict their
use of the ISP's services. Hale, supra note 7, at 555. For instance, one ISP ser-
vice agreement states that that user agrees "not to permit anyone else to use [the]
Member Account." See SBC Yahoo! Terms of Service, http://sbc.yahoo.com/terms/
(last visited May 15, 2006). By failing to password protect the wireless network,
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As discussed below, these consequences of joyriding should demon-
strate sufficient harm to impose liability for trespass.
The first harm occurs where the Wi-Fi operator experiences a de-
lay while accessing the Internet through the router. When the neigh-
bor accesses the Internet through the Wi-Fi operator's router, the
neighbor consumes resources of the Wi-Fi router.145 For example, if
the neighbor were to download large media files from the Internet, the
neighbor would decrease the speed at which the router transfers data
to the Wi-Fi operator.146 Similarly, if the neighbor were to engage in
peer-to-peer file sharing over the Internet, the neighbor would com-
promise router performance.147 Hence, when the neighbor intermed-
dles with the Wi-Fi operator's router, the neighbor could harm the Wi-
Fi operator's ability to optimally use the router.148 A router that
transmits data slower than it otherwise could is less valuable to the
Wi-Fi operator. The first harm appears to result in an impairment of
the router's value.
The second harm occurs where the Wi-Fi operator receives a com-
puter virus from the neighbor's computer. 149 By joyriding, a neighbor
the Wi-Fi operator who fails to institute security measures is arguably permitting
anyone within the physical range of the network's range to access the ISP's ser-
vices. The Wi-Fi operator could therefore be breaching the ISP agreement if that
agreement specifically restricts the usage of ISP services to the Wi-Fi operator.
Such a breach would likely impair the value of the router: the router would be the
means by which the Wi-Fi operator becomes liable to the ISP, so its value would
decrease in proportion to the amount of liability. A harm arguably results.
Despite the presence of this harm, it is not likely actionable under trespass to
chattel because it is economic in nature. Courts have refused to recognize eco-
nomic harm as a basis for supporting liability under a claim of trespass to chattel.
See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 300 (Cal. 2003) (refusing to recognize
'consequential economic damages" as satisfying the requirement for harm under
trespass to chattel).
Another harm could occur based on the fact that every website that a joyriding
neighbor visits will register the Wi-Fi operator's unique IP address. See Hines,
supra note 7. Tracing which Internet users visited particular websites could po-
tentially harm the reputation of the Wi-Fi operator, especially given that
downloading child pornography through another person's Wi-Fi connection has
become a reality. See id.; Seth Schiesel, Growth of Wireless Internet Opens New
Path for Thieves, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 19, 2005, at Al. It is possible, then, that a Wi-
Fi operator could suffer reputational harm due to the neighbor's joyriding.
145. See Hines, supra note 7 (reporting that joyriding can result in a decrease in In-
ternet performance for a Wi-Fi operator).
146. Hale, supra note 7, at 552; Hines, supra note 7.
147. Hale, supra note 7, at 553.
148. Id. at 552-53; Hines, supra note 7. Admittedly, not all instances of joyriding re-
sult in this first harm. Checking e-mail or viewing websites would not noticeably
slow down the rate of data transmission. See Hale, supra note 7, at 554.
149. See Klaus, supra note 41 ('Next generation virus and worms have become a
multi-vector attack programs [sic] that self-propagate through any TCP/IP inter-
face including wireless. If one computer on a wireless network is infected with a
hybrid threat, this threat can easily spread to other wireless computers and po-
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can unknowingly subject all other computers within the wireless net-
work to a virus.1 5 0 This is possible because all computers within the
same wireless local area network indiscriminately share data through
the Wi-Fi router.151 Consequently, the router becomes a device for
disseminating viruses from the neighbor's computer to the Wi-Fi oper-
ator's computer. The neighbor's conduct transforms the router from a
valuable conduit for Internet access to a noxious chamber of virus dif-
fusion.15 2 When the neighbor transmits electronic signals containing
a virus through the Wi-Fi operator's router, the value of the router
decreases. The second harm thus results in an impairment of the
router's value. 153
It could be argued that trespass to chattel does not lie because
neither of these alleged harms actually impair the physical condition
of the router. The Restatement provides that in most instances, ac-
tionable impairment of a chattel must result from some impairment of
the physical condition of the chattel.' 5 4 With respect to the first
harm, the delay that the Wi-Fi operator may notice while the neighbor
is joyriding does not imply that the router is physically dysfunctional.
On the contrary, the router functions exactly as it should: it splits its
resources between the computers connected to the wireless net-
tentially internal computers behind the wireless network."); see also Kumagai,
supra note 8.
The opposite situation-where the joyriding neighbor receives a virus from
the Wi-Fi operator-would not give rise to a tort action against the Wi-Fi opera-
tor. Presumably the joyriding neighbor would bring a negligence suit against the
Wi-Fi operator for breaching a duty of care to operate the network without any
harmful computer viruses. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 30, at
164-65 (outlining the elements of a negligence cause of action). The Wi-Fi opera-
tor would likely be viewed as having assumed the risk of harm by logging onto
the wireless network. See id. § 68, at 484-85 (explaining the considerations in
finding an implied assumption of risk). Likely the situation would be analogous
to a property owner who allows his bumble bees to fly onto land where the bees
consume poison. See Jeanes v. Holtz, 211 P.2d 925, 927 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949)
(ruling that defendant was not negligent where neighbor's bees came onto defen-
dant's land and consumed poisonous fertilizer). Just as the landowner would not
be liable for negligently killing the bees, so also would the Wi-Fi operator not be
liable for negligently spreading a computer virus. See id.
150. See Klaus, supra note 41; see generally discussion supra note 56.
151. See Klaus, supra note 41; Kumagai, supra note 8; Linksys White Paper, supra
note 42.
152. Protecting a computer from receiving a virus through a local network requires a
unique type of computer firewall that is unlike a firewall designed to protect
against viruses received through the Internet. See Hines, supra note 7 (encour-
aging Wi-Fi users to institute firewalls specifically designed for protecting vi-
ruses from spreading among network users); Tyson, supra note 57 ("A firewall is
simply a program or hardware device that filters the information coming through
the Internet connection into your private network or computer system.").
153. RESTATEMENT OF TORT § 218, at 420 (1958).
154. Id. § 218 cmt. h, at 422.
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work.' 55 A delay in data transmission may result from the neighbor's
use of the router, but that router is performing as optimally efficient
as it is capable of performing.15 6 There is no physical impairment.
With respect to the second harm, disseminating computer viruses
through a router does not damage the physical condition of the
router.15 7 The viruses pass through the router, but they do not actu-
ally harm the functionality of the router.15s During and after the
transmission of a computer virus through a router, the router per-
forms just as it did prior to the virus transmission. It continues to
send and receive data in an efficient manner. Thus, neither delaying
a Wi-Fi operator's data transmission nor transmitting a virus through
the router results in physical impairment of the router.
Admittedly, the neighbor's conduct does not physically impair the
router. This fact, however, does not imply that the neighbor has not
committed a trespass. 159 A harmful trespass to chattel may occur
when an actor temporarily deprives another of the ability to use a
chattel, even where the chattel is not physically impaired or where the
actor does not physically dispossess the chattel from the owner. 16 0
For example, locking a car owner's keys in the car deprives the owner
of the car's use, although the car owner is not physically dispossessed
of the car. Liability for such deprivation of use requires that the time
period of deprivation be so substantial that it is possible to estimate
155. See Curt Franklin, How Routers Work, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/
router.htm/printable (last visited May 15, 2006) (explaining the operations of a
router).
156. See id.
157. See Marshall Brain, How Computer Viruses Work, http://computer.howstuff
works.com/virus.htm/printable (last visited May 15, 2006) (noting that computer
viruses can harm files on a computer machine).
158. See id.
159. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 218(c) & cmt. i, at 420, 423 (stating that harmful
contact may occur where the chattel owner is deprived of the chattel's use).
160. Id. The argument against finding a trespass because no physical impairment is
present is also flawed for another reason. Physical impairment is not absolutely
required for an intermeddling to be actionable. According to the Restatement, it
is possible that 'the value to the owner of a particular type of chattel may be
impaired by dealing with it in a manner that does not affect its physical condi-
tion." Id. § 218 cmt. h, at 422. For instance, a person who wears another's linge-
rie, or who brushes the person's own teeth with another's toothbrush, commits a
trespass to chattel even though the chattel remains physically unimpaired. Id.
The lingerie and toothbrush owner could sell their respective chattels for the
same price as they could before the actor intermeddled with the chattels, yet from
their standpoint, the their chattels have decreased in value. Value arises from
the fact that no one else makes use of them, even though the chattels function
properly. Although the router is not the same sort of chattel as lingerie or a
toothbrush, it seems that value lies in the fact that the neighbor does not joyride
on the router. Under the lingerie-toothbrush rationale, a court could find that
the neighbor's intermeddling is trespassory without finding that physical contact
occurred. See id.
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the loss caused by that deprivation. 16 1 In the car example, if the car
owner were deprived of using the car for a mere hour, trespass to chat-
tel would lie according to the Restatement.1 6 2
The two harms that could result from the neighbor's intermeddling
with the router appear to deprive the Wi-Fi operator of the router's
use in a manner sufficient to impose trespassory liability. The delay
that the Wi-Fi operator experiences because of the neighbor's joyrid-
ing demonstrates that the Wi-Fi operator is unable to use the full ca-
pacity of the router. Assuming that this delay occurs for a sufficient
time period, e.g., an hour, 163 the deprivation of use would give rise to a
trespass. Similarly, a computer virus that the Wi-Fi operator receives
through the router demonstrates that the Wi-Fi operator is unable to
use the router without inhibition, i.e., connecting to the Internet with-
out receiving viruses from other computers within the wireless net-
work. The Wi-Fi operator is deprived of realizing full use of the
router. As infinitesimally short as the time period is in which the vi-
rus passes through a router, the time period would nevertheless be of
a sufficient duration to be actionable because the harm would be cal-
culable.164 Thus, the Wi-Fi operator cannot make full use of the
router where the two harms occur.
That the Wi-Fi operator can still make a partial use of the router
while the neighbor is joyriding should not affect the conclusion that
actionable harm occurs. In effect, the two possible harms represent
trespasses on two "sticks" within the Wi-Fi operator's "bundle of
sticks."165 Although the Wi-Fi operator can exercise other property
uses in the router, the Wi-Fi operator cannot exercise every use. Disa-
bling a chattel owner's ability to exercise only some uses over the chat-
tel-rather than all uses-results in a trespass to chattel, whereas
disabling a chattel owner's ability to exercise all rights results in con-
version.166 It is this distinction between disabling a portion of prop-
erty rights in a chattel and disabling all property rights in a chattel
that gives rise to the two different causes of action. 16 7 As one com-
161. See id. § 218 cmt. i, at 423.
162. Id. illus. 4.
163. See id.
164. Id. § 218 cmt. i, at 423 ("The deprivation of use, not amounting to a dispossession,
necessary to render the actor liable for his use or other intermeddling with the
chattel of another without the other's consent must be for a time so substantial
that it is possible to estimate the loss caused thereby.").
165. See CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 75, at 2 ("It appears, then, that 'ownership' con-
sists of many disparate claims [with respect to one chattel] sanctioned by law
against many persons-a 'bundle of sticks,' as legal scholars sometimes have put
it.").
166. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 14, at 85-86 (describing trespass to
chattel as interferences "which are not sufficiently important to be classed as
conversion").
167. See id.
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mentator notes, trespass to chattel is the little brother to conver-
sion.168 Hence, the fact that the Wi-Fi operator is still able to exercise
some property rights in the router does not detract from the argument
that a trespass lies.16 9 The fact is consistent with the doctrine of tres-
pass to chattel. 170
b. Harmless Intermeddling with the Router
The two harms described above-delay in data transmission and
dissemination of viruses-appear to satisfy the requirement for harm
under the tort of trespass to chattel.171 But a neighbor can joyride
without either of these harms occurring. The Wi-Fi operator would
not notice any delay in the speed of data transmission if the neighbor
uses the Wi-Fi router merely to view websites or to check e-mail.17 2
Nor would the router be a means for transmitting viruses if the neigh-
bor's computer is not infected with one. Seemingly harmless inter-
meddling could therefore result from joyriding.17 3
Despite the doctrine that harmless intermeddling does not produce
an actionable trespass to chattel, 17 4 a strong argument can be made
that an exception to this general doctrine should exist where the inter-
meddling occurs in cyberspace. Support for such an exception arises
in caselaw. 1 75 In the context of cyberspace, courts have not always
168. Id.
169. See id.; eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (finding harm based on the fact that defendant had deprived plaintiff "of
the ability to use [a] portion of its personal property for its own purposes") (em-
phasis added).
170. The point that not every use must be disabled for a trespass to occur is illustrated
by the following example. Consider someone who intentionally disengages a
spark plug from another's car so that the car performs poorly. The car is not
permanently damaged by disengaging the spark plug. The car owner can still
speed on a highway, open the sunroof, listen to its radio, stop at a light, and
perform nearly every other use of the car. Nevertheless, the car owner cannot
run the engine at its most efficient level in the absence of the spark plug. That is,
the car owner cannot realize one possible use of the car--driving the car with all
spark plugs. During the time that the spark plug is disengaged, the car owner is
deprived of making full use of the car. The value temporarily decreases. Tres-
pass to chattel lies.
171. See discussion supra subsection III.B.2.a.
172. Hale, supra note 7, at 554.
173. Id.
174. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e, at 421-22 (1958).
175. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(ruling that harm resulted from defendant's searches of a website even where the
searches constituted "a negligible load on plaintiffs computer systems"); Regis-
ter.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same);
Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 550 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding actiona-
ble harm based on an injury to goodwill); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (commenting that the defendant's
use of ISP's disk space and processing power when the defendant sent an e-mail).
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adhered to the requirement that there must be actual harm for an
actionable trespass to chattel to lie. 176 Bidder's Edge is a good exam-
ple.17 7 There, the bot device that Bidder's Edge used to search eBay's
website consumed approximately one percent of eBay's server capac-
ity.1 7 8 Consequently, the bot did not detract from eBay's ability to
meet the needs of all other Internet users who accessed its website. 179
The court, however, held that Bidder's Edge caused eBay harm be-
cause the bot "consume [d] at least a portion of [eBay's] bandwidth and
server capacity."' 8 0 Recognizing that the level of bandwidth that Bid-
der's Edge consumed did not actually pose any harm to eBay, the
court reasoned that if that activity were permissible, then the activity
could increase, and in the aggregate, the activity could harm eBay.18 l
While admitting that there was no actual harm, the court found the
harm requirement of trespass to chattel to be satisfied.1 8 2
Bidder's Edge does not stand alone in judicial softening of the
harm requirement. In Register.com the court contemplated the same
facts as those present in Bidder's Edge.183 As in Bidder's Edge, the
Register.com court found an actionable harm based on the defendant's
use of automated software that searched a website. 18 4 The court
opined that the "possibility" of harm to the plaintiffs server capacity
was sufficient to satisfy the harm requirement under trespass to chat-
tel.i8 5 Similarly, in CompuServe, the court held that the mass e-mail
that the defendants had sent through the ISP produced actionable
harm because the e-mail placed a "demand" on disk space and process-
ing power, which resources could have otherwise been available for
176. See cases cited supra note 175; cf. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 218 cmt. e, at 421-22
(requiring harm for trespass to chattel to lie).
177. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
178. Id. at 1064.
179. See id. at 1071 (discounting defendant's argument that website searches repre-
sented "a negligible load on plaintiffs computer systems" because the searches
deprived plaintiff of an ability to use a portion of personal property).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 1066, 1071. The court attempted to portray its discourse on harm as consis-
tent with trespass jurisprudence. See id. at 1071. The flaw in its reasoning is
apparent, however. Initially, the court relied on the true premise that the law
does not recognize a right to commit a harmless intermeddling. Id. From that
premise, the court faultily concluded that harmless intermeddling is actionable.
Id. The fact that the law does not recognize a right to commit harmless intermed-
dling does not imply that the law condemns harmless intermeddling. Despite the
court's ostensible attempt to cram its holding into the well established jurispru-
dence of tort law, it failed. The court introduced an exception to the rule-not a
consistency.
182. Id. at 1066, 1071.
183. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243-44, 248-50 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
184. Id. at 249-50.
185. Id. at 250.
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ISP customers.' 8 6 That demand, however, did not detract from the
capability of the ISP's computer equipment to function properly.' 8 7
Indeed, any single e-mail results in a demand of disk space and
processing power.' 8 8 The mass e-mails did not deter the ISP's ability
to facilitate Internet traffic; instead, the e-mails merely invoked that
ability.189
These cases suggest that in the context of determining whether
electronic trespass exists on the Internet, the harm necessary for an
actionable trespass need only be minimal in nature. Courts have
looked to the potential for harm, rather than actual harm, in deciding
whether the harm element is satisfied in cyberspace.190 An electronic
signal is harmful when it could affect the performance of the physical
object at issue if the signal were duplicated in the aggregate.191
One case that implicitly supports this interpretation of these cases
is Intel Corp. v. Hamidi.192 There, the California Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a trespass to chattel occurred when the defendant
sent e-mails critical of his former employer, Intel, to current Intel em-
ployees.19 3 The court held that the tort did not lie because the alleged
harm stemmed from the content of the e-mails, rather than an injury
to the functionality of Intel's computer system.19 4 In its analysis, the
court distinguished Bidder's Edge, Register.com, and CompuServe on
the grounds that those cases dealt with either actual or "threatened"
harm, whereas the defendant's e-mails neither actually harmed nor
threatened to harm his employer's computer system.19 5 The Hamidi
decision therefore implicitly endorses the potential-for-harm rationale
set forth in the above cases.1 96
Also notable in Hamidi is the fact that Intel argued that the e-
mails caused harm in the form of economic damage.197 The Intel em-
ployees, Intel alleged, were distracted by the content of the e-mails,
186. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
187. See id. at 1022.
188. See Marshall Brain, How E-Mail Works, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/
email.htm/printable (last visited May 15, 2006).
189. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
190. See cases cited supra note 175.
191. See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
("If [defendant's] activity is allowed to continue unchecked, it would encourage
other auction aggregators to engage in similar recursive searching of the eBay
system such that eBay would suffer irreparable harm from reduced system per-
formance, system unavailability, or data losses.").
192. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
193. Id. at 299-300.
194. Id. at 303-04.
195. Id. at 304-06.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 307-08.
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causing Intel to incur loss of productivity. 198 The Hamidi court re-
jected this argument, holding that economic damages did not satisfy
the harm requirement of trespass to chattel.199 The tort required the
harm to be directly to the chattel.200 Thus, consequential business-
related damages appear to be neither sufficient nor necessary for tres-
pass to chattel to lie in the context of sending electronic signals over
the Internet.20
According to this recent Internet jurisprudence, the radio signals
that a joyriding neighbor sends to a Wi-Fi operator's router appear to
constitute trespassory harm. As Bidder's Edge, Register.com, and
CompuServe suggest, the potential for physical harm that an elec-
tronic signal poses to computer equipment appears sufficient to satisfy
the harm requirement. 20 2 The fact that the harm does not cause con-
sequential economic damage to the owner of the computer equipment
should not, according to Hamidi, affect the trespassory analysis.203
These general principles imply that the electronic signal which the
neighbor causes to contact the Wi-Fi operator's router is sufficient to
constitute trespassory harm. Although the neighbor's signal may not
drain the router's capacity, if duplicated in the aggregate the signals
would.204
Tellingly, courts have remained silent as to why they have softened
the harm requirement for a trespass to chattel arising in cyber-
space. 20 5 Their silence suggests that policy concerns outweigh the
value of an antiquated tort doctrine.206 At the outset of the Internet,
uncertainty as to how the law would treat the new electronic medium
threatened to hamper its commercial viability.207 Faced with a prom-
ising new medium of exchange, and likely noting its relatively infan-
tile stage, courts delivered the needed certainty. Courts provided
market participants certainty that their Internet investments were
198. Id. at 299-300.
199. Id. at 300.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See cases cited supra note 175.
203. See Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 300.
204. Hale, supra note 7, at 547.
205. See cases cited supra note 175.
206. See Quilter, supra note 88, at 435-36 (arguing that courts have incorrectly ap-
plied trespass to chattel to deal with public annoyances on the Internet).
207. See Daniel Dern, Meeting the Challenges of Business and End-User Communities
on the Internet: What They Want, What They Need, What They're Doing, in PUBLIC
ACCESS TO THE INTERNET 212-13 (Brian Kahin & James Keller eds., 1996) (ex-
plaining, at the time that the Internet was initially becoming commercial, that
commercial Internet users seek "[aiccountability and clear problem-resolution
paths").
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well protected, and they did so even before any harm occurred. 2 08
Confidence in the new intangible, commercial medium could not be
sacrificed at the expense of upholding a doctrine that was crafted for
problems arising in the disparate realm of the physical. The policy of
promoting and protecting valuable benefits of the Internet prevailed
over a principle established for a wholly distinct ontology.
This policy of liberally protecting Internet investors strengthens
the argument that a joyriding neighbor has acted tortiously. Because
the neighbor can access a wireless network at no cost, the neighbor is
neither likely to purchase a Wi-Fi router nor likely to purchase the
services of an ISP. It seems likely that at least some joyriding neigh-
bors value the Wi-Fi connection at a level equal to or greater than the
cost of ISP services or of a Wi-Fi router. 209 Assuming that this is true,
these joyriding neighbors would purchase ISP services and Wi-Fi rout-
ers if they were not provided the opportunity to access the Internet
through Wi-Fi operators' networks. ISPs and manufacturers of Wi-Fi
routers are therefore not realizing a complete economic return on their
investment in Internet technology.210 Prohibiting joyriding would en-
sure that they are rewarded for their investment.
The upshot of this discussion about the seemingly harmless nature
of Wi-Fi joyriding is that the joyriding does result in a harm, but on a
macro level. Judicial holdings dealing with equipment that facilitates
Internet activity seem to indicate that if the conduct at issue would
produce harm were it duplicated in the aggregate, then the harm re-
quirement is satisfied.211 Those holdings also implicitly indicate that
protecting participants of Internet-based technology is sufficient rea-
son to find actionable harm where a single instance of intermeddling
could produce harm if duplicated en mass. 2 12 In short, there appears
to be room in cyberspace to carve out an exception to the requirement
that the chattel owner experience actual harm. And Wi-Fi technology
208. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066-72 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
209. This conclusion seems likely given that the neighbor must purchase a wireless
network adapter to interface with the wireless network. See discussion supra
Part II. A wireless network adapter costs approximately seventy dollars. See
Best Buy, http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?navLevel=4&type=category&
navHistory=catOOOOO%2BcatOlOOO%2BcatOlO24&id=catOlO32 (last visited Jan.
6, 2006) (displaying retail of price of 802.11g Wireless Notebook Card to be
$70.99).
210. Kern, supra note 2, at 110 (discussing the detrimental effect that free-riding
users of a wireless network have on the capacity and infrastructure of an ISP).
211. See Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1066 ("If [defendant's] activity is allowed to
continue unchecked, it would encourage other auction aggregators to engage in
similar recursive searching of the eBay system such that eBay would suffer irrep-
arable harm from reduced system performance, system unavailability, or data
losses.").
212. See cases cited supra note 175.
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should be a part of that cyberspace exception. Seemingly harmless
intermeddling should be actionable.
3. Intent
The joyriding neighbor appears to satisfy the intentionality re-
quirement of trespass to chattel. To commit a trespass to chattel, an
actor must intend to commit the intermeddling contact. 2 13 This
means that the joyriding neighbor must intend to use another person's
router.2 14 The presence of this intent is apparent. In accessing the
router, the neighbor chooses a wireless network through which his or
her wireless network adapter can interface. 2 15 By selecting the Wi-Fi
operator's network from a computer prompt, the neighbor affirma-
tively demonstrates an intent to use another person's router. The
neighbor's intentional selection of the Wi-Fi operator's wireless con-
nection demonstrates an intent to intermeddle with the router.
Two further points are worth noting about the joyriding neighbor's
intent.2 16 First, the fact that the neighbor does not intend to harm the
Wi-Fi operator does not affect the intent analysis. An actor need not
intend to commit the harm that results from an intermeddling; the
intent requirement is satisfied even where the actor acts under a mis-
take of fact.2 17 A harmful intermeddling is not excused on the basis
that the actor believed that the intermeddling would not be harm-
ful.218 Accordingly, the neighbor's intent to access the Internet
through the router is sufficient to satisfy the intent requirement.
That the neighbor does not intend to slow down the data transmission
for the Wi-Fi operator, to spread a virus to the Wi-Fi operator, or to
impede the market for ISP service should not affect whether the
neighbor satisfies the intent requirement. 2 19
213. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217 cmt. c, at 418 (1958).
214. See id.
215. See cases cited supra note 175.
216. A third point is also noteworthy. The intent requirement distinguishes the
neighbor's tortious conduct from the harmless conduct of other wireless-device
users. See discussion supra subsection III.B.L.b (discussing the distinction be-
tween electrical devices that cause harmless intermeddling and those which do
not). No cause of action lies against parents who operate baby monitors that hap-
pen to interfere with the performance of another's Wi-Fi router. See RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 217 cmt. c, at 418. Nor is there a cause of action against
cordless phone users. See id. Presumably, a person who uses these wireless de-
vices does not intend to intermeddle with another person's use of a wireless
device.
217. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217 cmt. c, at 418 ("[I]t is immaterial that the actor
intermeddles with the chattel under a mistake of law or fact that the possessor
has consented to his dealing with it.").
218. Id.
219. See id. It should be noted that one commentator has voiced a contrary view. See
Kern, supra note 2, at 155. Without relying on any authority, he states: "The
intent component of (trespass to chattel] requires that a roaming [Wi-Fi] user
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Second, assuming that the neighbor does not know the identity of
the Wi-Fi operator, such that the neighbor knows only that the Wi-Fi
router belongs to some other person, the intent requirement is still
satisfied. Intermeddling is present even if the actor does not know the
identity of the chattel owner.2 20 Throwing a baseball at a car satisfies
the intent requirement of trespass to chattel, even where the car
owner is unknown to the thrower. Likewise, accessing the Internet
through a wireless network that does not belong to the neighbor satis-
fies the intent requirement, even where the identity of the Wi-Fi oper-
ator is unknown to the neighbor. It is sufficient that the joyriding
neighbor knows that the Wi-Fi connection is not his or her own.
IV. DEFENSES OF TRESPASS TO CHATTEL APPLIED
TO WI-FI JOYRIDING
A joyriding neighbor could argue two defenses to the trespass to
chattel claim. The first is that the Wi-Fi operator has consented to the
joyriding by failing to password protect the router from unauthorized
use.2 2 1 The second is that joyriding constitutes a permissible means
for the neighbor to abate a nuisance that the Wi-Fi operator creates-
hogging the wireless spectra. 22 2 Neither defense should prevail.
Each is discussed below.
A. The Wi-Fi Operator's Seeming Consent to Joyriding
A joyriding neighbor could argue that joyriding is permissible be-
cause the Wi-Fi operator has failed to implement security measures
which would preclude the neighbor from accessing the router. A per-
son who consents to otherwise tortious conduct cannot recover against
the actor.2 2 3 Consent may be manifest by action or inaction, and need
not be communicated to the actor.2 24 When a person's silence would
be reasonably understood as intended to indicate consent, that silence
is a manifestation of apparent consent.2 25
knew or was reckless as to whether his or her access would cause a disruption on
the operator's service." Id. This statement contravenes the express dictate of the
general rule set forth in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217 cmt.
c, at 418.
220. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 217 cmt. c, at 418. ("[A]n intention is present when
an act is done for the purpose of using or otherwise intermeddling with a chattel
221. See discussion infra section WA.
222. See discussion infra section 1V.B.
223. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 892A, at 364 ("One who effectively consents to con-
duct of another intended to invade his interests cannot recover in an action of tort
for the conduct or for harm resulting from it.").
224. Id. § 892, at 362 ("[Consent] may be manifested by action or inaction and need
not be communicated to the actor.").
225. Id. § 892 cmt. c, at 363 (explaining "apparent consent").
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The neighbor's consent argument is based solely on the fact that
the Wi-Fi operator fails to implement a password so that others can-
not access the Internet through the router. The argument effectively
implies that anyone should be permitted to access a wireless network
unless the Wi-Fi operator institutes security measures. The argu-
ment draws support from cyberspace jurisprudence. 2 26 In EF Cul-
tural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp.,2 2 7 the First Circuit considered whether
a website owner had provided consent for the defendant to use auto-
mated software to search its website. 228 The court concluded that be-
cause the website owner had not expressly restricted the use of the
website, the owner had implicitly consented to the defendant's con-
duct.22 9 In dicta, the court commented that a lack of consent can be
manifest by the presence of password protection.2 30
Other courts have considered the issue of consent. In CompuServe,
the court opined that the ISP provided "tacit" consent for anyone on
the Internet to send e-mail to its subscribers, but that the ISP had
affirmatively revoked its consent to the defendants. 231 The basis for
this finding of "tacit" consent was that the ISP had created a system
for allowing anyone on the Internet to e-mail its subscribers.232 In
other words, consent was based on the fact that the ISP system was
designed for the purpose of allowing anyone on the Internet to send e-
mails to subscribers.2 33
The Bidder's Edge court also opined on the doctrine of consent. 234
The court held that eBay had granted "conditional" consent to In-
ternet users to access its website. 2 35 The consent was granted upon
an express condition on its website stating that users were not to use
robotic data-collection devices on its site.236 In other words, a pre-
sumption of consent existed, and eBay acted to limit that presump-
tion.2 37 Restriction of website access was obtained by making a
226. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2003);
eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000);
CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023-24 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
227. 318 F.3d 58, 60, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2003).
228. Id. at 60, 62-63.
229. Id. at 63. The court actually held that the owner had "authorized" the conduct,
rather than "consented" to the conduct. Id.
230. Id. ("[Plassword protection itself normally limits authorization by implication
(and technology), even without express terms.").
231. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023-24.
232. Id. at 1023.
233. Id. at 1023-24.
234. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1060, 1070.
237. See id.
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statement on the website, implicitly suggesting that a presumption of
consent did exist.2 38
Relying on these cases, the joyriding neighbor could argue that the
absence of any password protection by the Wi-Fi operator implies that
the Wi-Fi operator consents to anyone using the router. Zefer seems
to imply that the absence of password protection denotes consent to
use property in cyberspace. 2 3 9 Further, like the ISP in CompuServe, a
Wi-Fi operator creates a system specifically designed to allow anyone
within its range to access the Internet.240 Because the very function
of the Wi-Fi connection is to provide any person within its physical
range access to the Internet, that function arguably creates a pre-
sumption that the Wi-Fi operator consents to anyone accessing the In-
ternet through the router.2 4 1 Finally, just as the website owner in
Bidder's Edge could easily restrict the presumption that anyone could
access the owner's website, 242 the Wi-Fi operator can easily restrict
the presumption that anyone can use the Wi-Fi operator's router: the
Wi-Fi operator need merely set up a password.243 By failing to imple-
ment a password, the Wi-Fi operator seems to assume the risk of Wi-
Fi joyriding.
Despite these arguments in favor of construing the Wi-Fi opera-
tor's failure to implement a password as implicit consent for others to
joyride, such a presumption should not exist. As an initial matter,
Zefer's statement that a password denotes an absence of consent does
not imply that an absence of a password denotes consent. 244 An anal-
ogy may illustrate the disconnect between these propositions. Con-
sider a bicycle owner. If the owner locks the bicycle, the lock
demonstrates that the owner does not consent to another person's use
of the bicycle. But if the owner does not lock the bicycle, this does not
imply that the owner consents to another's use of the bicycle. It is
entirely possible that the bicycle owner does not lock the bicycle be-
cause the owner has trouble remembering combinations, or perhaps
disdains spending time entering combinations to unlock property.
Analogously, the absence of a password on a wireless network does not
imply that the Wi-Fi operator consents to another's use of the router.
That absence implies nothing more than the fact that the Wi-Fi opera-
tor chooses not to implement a password. Perhaps the Wi-Fi operator
disdains having to spend time entering a password each time the oper-
238. See id. This fact also influenced the court in EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer
Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003).
239. See Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63.
240. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1023-24
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
241. See id.
242. See Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. at 1070.
243. See Kern, supra note 2, at 155-56.
244. See Zefer, 318 F.3d at 63.
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ator accesses the Internet, or perhaps the owner simply has a bad
memory for remembering passwords. Failure to install protective de-
vices so that another cannot use property does not imply that a prop-
erty owner consents to the use. Hence, Zefer's observation that the
presence of a password implies the absence of consent should not be
construed as meaning that an absence of a password implies the pres-
ence of consent.
On a more substantive level, the cited cases should not be inter-
preted as suggesting that a Wi-Fi operator has consented to joyriding
because none of the cited cases deal with wireless networks. The fact
that the consent in the cited cases was manifest by ISPs and website
owners distinguishes them from the context of wireless networks.245
An ISP usually realizes economic benefit when Internet users make
use of the ISP's services, including its e-mail service. 24 6 E-mail ex-
change increases demand for the ISP service.2 47 Likewise, a website
usually becomes more commercially valuable as more Internet users
view the website.2 48 In short, the commercial model for the Internet
has developed such that the conduct of e-mailing ISP subscribers and
viewing websites are activities that propagate economic benefits for
ISPs and website owners. 2 49 For this reason, the presumption is
sound that these property owners consent to otherwise trespassory
contact in cyberspace.
The situation of a Wi-Fi operator is markedly different than that of
an ISP or a website owner. A joyriding neighbor engages in free-rid-
ing parasitic behavior. Although the Wi-Fi operator may not necessa-
rily be harmed by the behavior, the Wi-Fi operator does not stand to
gain any economic benefit. In the absence of any possibility that the
Wi-Fi operator could realize economic benefit from the neighbor acces-
sing the Internet, the presumption that the owner has consented ap-
pears unjustified. Other than altruistic tendencies, there is no reason
245. See Kern, supra note 2, at 156 ("It is not clear that a court would use [the same
test for consent as in the website trespass cases] with respect to a roaming Wi-Fi
user because a wireless network may in some cases have more of a private char-
acter than a website.").
246. See, e.g., NetZero ISP, http://www.netzero.com (last visited May 15, 2006) (offer-
ing e-mail service as a benefit for Internet users who pay the ISP a fixed monthly
fee).
247. See, e.g., Earthlink ISP, http://www.earthlink.net/membercenter/benefits/ (last
visited May 15, 2006) (listing the ability to exchange e-mail as a benefit that
Internet users realize when subscribing to the ISP service).
248. This fact is evidenced by the growing business of website advertising. See, e.g.,
Search Engine Wizards, http://www.searchenginewizards.com (last visited May
15, 2006) ("Using effective search engine solutions, companies can add new reve-
nue streams that were previously unavailable."); Multimedia Advertising Ser-
vices, Inc., http://www.masresults.com/advertising.htm (last visited May 15,
2006) (selling a website marketing service).
249. See sources cited supra notes 246-48.
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that a Wi-Fi operator would consent to joyriding. Presuming consent
would be imposing a choice where the Wi-Fi operator was unaware of
the conduct and preferred not to implement a password. In the Wi-Fi
context, there is no reason to create a presumption of consent based on
the absence of a password.
The absence of password protection also does not denote an as-
sumption of risk that excuses the joyriding neighbor's conduct. It is
true that by not implementing a password the Wi-Fi operator assumes
the risk that a neighbor will joyride. But that fact does not excuse the
neighbor's conduct. Assumption of risk is relevant in examining only
a claim of negligence. 2 50 The inquiry at hand is one of intentional
tort.2 5 1 As much as a chattel owner may put at risk the safety of a
chattel, if an actor commits an intentional trespass on the chattel
without the owner's consent, the actor is still liable.2 52 Assumption of
risk is not a defense to intentional tort.2 53 Consider a china-shop
owner who invites a bull owner to shop at the china shop-with the
bull. Unquestionably the china-shop owner assumes a great risk in
extending that invitation. Yet if after walking into the china shop
with the bull, the bull owner strikes the bull intending for the bull to
destroy all the china, the bull owner is still liable for the resultant
damage. That the china-shop owner places at risk all the china by
allowing the bull to enter the shop is of no consequence. 25 4 The inten-
tional act of the bull owner creates tortious liability. Similar to the
china-shop owner, the Wi-Fi operator places at risk the router's
use.2 55 That risk is of no consequence because the joyriding neighbor
intentionally acts to interfere with the Wi-Fi router. The intent is
dispositive.
It should lastly be noted that the Wi-Fi operator's failure to pass-
word protect the network is not akin to establishing consent through
250. See Gates v. Navy, 617 S.E.2d 163, 167 (Ga. App. 2005) ("It is well-settled that
the defenses of ... assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are not
valid defenses to intentional, wilful, or wanton and reckless torts .... ") (internal
citations omitted); see generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 68, at
480-98 (discussing assumption of risk in context of negligence defenses).
251. See discussion supra Part III.
252. Gates, 617 S.E.2d at 167; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 18, at
113 ("The mere fact that one is willing to incur a risk that conduct in deliberate
violation of the rules of a sporting contest will be committed does not mean that
one is willing for such conduct to be committed.").
253. Gates, 617 S.E.2d at 167.
254. See id.
255. The bull-in-the-china-shop example is by no means completely analogous to the
Wi-Fi scenario under consideration. The narrative is cited only for the general
proposition that assumption of risk is no defense to an intentional tort, and noth-
ing more than that. Unlike the bull owner, the joyriding neighbor presumably
does not intentionally slow down the router or transmit a virus through the
router. That difference does not detract from the inference drawn from the bull
narrative: assumption of risk is not a defense to an intentional tort.
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silence. Silence or inaction can denote consent, but only where the
chattel owner has knowledge of the actor using the chattel. 256 Silence
or inaction does not denote consent where the actor is oblivious to the
trespassory conduct. 2 57 Accordingly, failure to password protect a
wireless network could possibly be viewed as consent through silence
only if the Wi-Fi operator were aware of the conduct prior to choosing
not to password protect the network. The Wi-Fi operator's inaction is
not consent unless the Wi-Fi operator is aware of the tortious con-
duct. 258 But even then, a single oral objection to the use would pre-
clude the possibility that the Wi-Fi operator consents where the Wi-Fi
operator has not password protected the network. 259 Fences and locks
are not necessary to show that a property owner does not consent to
another's use of the property.2 6o A simple, one-time oral communica-
tion should suffice.
B. The Joyriding Neighbor's Seeming Abatement to a Wi-Fi
Nuisance
Another defense that the neighbor could argue is that joyriding is
permissible under the abatement-of-nuisance doctrine.2 61 The com-
mon law permits an actor to commit an act which would otherwise be
a trespass to chattel when the act is committed for the purpose of
abating a private nuisance that is caused by the chattel owner.2 62 A
private nuisance occurs where there is interference with a land-
256. See Kelly v. Cook, 73 So. 220, 221 (Ala. Ct. App. 1916) ("The evidence shows that
this cotton was taken in the absence of the plaintiff and delivered to the defen-
dant without her knowledge, and the mere silence of the plaintiff after knowledge
of the conversion was brought to her did not amount to a ratification of the taking
or a waiver of the tort.").
257. See id.; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 18, at 119-20 (commenting that
consent is not a defense to tortious conduct where the seeming consent is pro-
vided without full knowledge of the nature and quality of the conduct).
258. Cf. Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2272-73
(2004) (arguing that trespass to chattel should arise in the computer-network
context only if the network operator has implemented actual notice of conditions
for access to the network).
259. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 87, § 18, at 113 ("Silence and inaction
may manifest consent where a reasonable person would speak if he objected.")
(emphasis added).
260. See id.
261. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 264, at 498 (1958) ("One is privileged to commit an
act which would otherwise be a trespass to the chattel of another or a conversion
of it, for the purpose of abating a private nuisance created or maintained by the
other, if the act is a reasonable means of abating the nuisance, and if the other
upon demand has failed to abate the nuisance, or the actor reasonably believes
that such demand is impractical or useless.").
262. Id.
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owner's private use and enjoyment of land.263 Abatement of the nui-
sance is permissible to the extent that the abatement is considered
reasonable. 2 64 For instance, courts have considered it reasonable for
a neighbor to cut tree branches which were overhanging into the air-
space over the neighbor's land.2 6 5
The joyriding neighbor could argue that the Wi-Fi operator is caus-
ing a nuisance on the neighbor's property. There are a limited num-
ber of channels within the bandwidth frequencies on which Wi-Fi
radio signals can exist.2 66 By operating a wireless network, then, the
Wi-Fi operator causes a shortage of channels on which the neighbor
could operate a wireless network or other wireless device. The neigh-
bor cannot set up his or her own wireless network because someone
else is hogging the band. In other words, the neighbor cannot enjoy
the use of the radio signals on the airspace over the land, so a nui-
sance seems arguably present.
After arguing that the Wi-Fi operator is causing a nuisance, the
joyriding neighbor could further argue that a reasonable abatement of
this nuisance would be to make use of the wireless network. By using
the Wi-Fi operator's network, the neighbor abates the harm that the
Wi-Fi operator has created. A shortage of bandwidth is of no concern
to a neighbor seeking wireless Internet access if the neighbor can ac-
cess the Internet through Wi-Fi radio signals that are already present
in the airspace over the neighbor's land. Thus, the neighbor could ar-
gue that the otherwise tortious conduct of joyriding is excused based
on the neighbor's abatement of the Wi-Fi operator's nuisance. 26 7
This abatement-of-nuisance argument would not likely succeed.
To begin with, nuisance claims relating to radio-frequency interfer-
ence are preempted by the Federal Communications Act ("FCA").268
The FCA contains no provision that would prohibit a person from us-
263. Id. § 821D, at 100 ("A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another's
interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.").
264. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 89, at 635 (1998).
265. Hickey v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., 55 N.W. 989, 990-91 (Mich. 1893); see also 66
C.J.S. Nuisances § 87, at 634 ("It has been held that the person aggrieved may
cut off branches of a neighbor's trees overhanging his land, remove a part of an
adjoining owner's wall which overhangs his premises, or cut off the eaves of a
building overhanging his property.").
266. See Klaus, supra note 41; Linksys White Paper, supra note 42, at 6.
267. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 264, at 498 (outlining the abatement-of-nuisance
defense to trespass to chattel).
268. See Broyde v. Gotham Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding
that enforcement of a nuisance claim based on radio-signal interference would
contravene the doctrine of preemption, frustrating the objectives of the FCA);
GoForth v. Smith, 991 S.W.2d 579, 584-85 (Ark. 1999) (ruling that the FCC has
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving radio-interference nuisance claims);
Still v. Michaels, 803 P.2d 124, 124-25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (same); Blackburn v.
Doubleday Broad. Co., 353 N.W.2d 550, 555-57 (Minn. 1984) (same).
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ing all possible frequencies on an unlicensed bandwidth.269 It would
not likely apply. 27 0 Because preemption precludes the neighbor from
raising a nuisance claim, and because the FCA does not likely apply in
that situation, the neighbor cannot likely raise this nuisance-abate-
ment argument.
Assuming arguendo that the neighbor could raise the nuisance-
abatement argument, it would be highly unusual that abatement
would be permissible. Abatement is permissible only in situations of
extreme or urgent necessity. 27 1 The complained-of nuisance must ac-
tually exist.272 In the Wi-Fi context, then, abatement would be per-
missible only if the Wi-Fi operator were causing a shortage of
channels on the unlicensed frequencies, and only if the neighbor actu-
ally unsuccessfully attempted to access the Internet using his or her
own Wi-Fi equipment and ISP.273 This situation is highly unlikely.274
As an initial matter, two wireless networks are capable of coexisting
within the same close proximity.2 75 Crowding out a wireless network
would occur only if multiple other wireless devices were also in opera-
tion in the same close proximity.2 76 The circumstance of close proxim-
ity suggests that those other wireless devices crowding out the
neighbor's wireless network would likely belong to the neighbor. If
the neighbor need merely stop using his or her microwave oven to op-
erate the wireless network, the complained-of nuisance would not ap-
pear to be "extreme."27 7 Abatement would not be permissible. 278
269. See 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2000) (prohibiting interference with radio communications
on licensed frequencies only).
270. The FCA grants the FCC authority to regulate bandwidths. See id. § 303. A re-
quirement for operating a device on unlicensed frequencies is that the operator
must accept interference. See 47 C.F.R. § 15.5(b) (2004). Thus, insofar as a de-
vice satisfies technical specifications, the FCC appears to permit interference
that such devices may cause within the unlicensed bandwidth. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 333; Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm To Come, 41 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 269, 287-88 (2004) ("[T]he FCC has opened the bands for low-power
transmissions by operators or members of the public without mandating licens-
ing or coordination. The only requirement is that the equipment used in these
unlicensed bands must satisfy certain technical specifications.").
271. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 89, at 635 (1998).
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. See Hewlett Packard, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth-Interference Issues, at 1 (Jan. 2002),
available at http://www.hp.com/rndlibrary/pdf/WiFiBluetoothcoexistance.pdf
("Only in extreme conditions, such as setting a Bluetooth-enabled cell phone
down next to an operating microwave oven, is it likely that communications will
cease altogether.").
275. Id. at 2 ("[T]here can be no more than three different Wi-Fi networks operating in
close proximity to one another.").
276. Id.
277. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 89, at 635 (stating that abatement is permissible only
in instances of "extreme" or "urgent" necessity).
278. See id.
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Even more important in the abatement analysis is the fact that
joyriding is not usually the result of the posited circumstances. Joy-
riding does not usually occur after a neighbor has subscribed to ISP
services, has purchased a Wi-Fi router, and then has unsuccessfully
attempted to connect to the ISP using that Wi-Fi router. Neighbors do
not joyride because they are unsuccessful at operating their own Wi-Fi
connection; they joyride to avoid paying ISP fees. The facts necessary
to support a nuisance-abatement argument are simply implausible. 279
V. CONCLUSION
The seemingly harmless conduct of accessing the Internet through
another's wireless network without authorization should be deemed
tortious. Joyriding should result in an actionable trespass to chattel.
A joyriding neighbor appears to trespass on the Wi-Fi operator's
router.28 0 When the neighbor sends electronic signals through the
router to access the Internet, those signals produce a physical effect on
the router that is sufficient to be deemed trespassory physical con-
duct.28 1 The neighbor intentionally causes this contact, thereby satis-
fying the intentionality requirement for trespass.28 2 Harm may also
be present.28 3 The Wi-Fi operator may experience delayed Internet
transmission or receive viruses from the joyriding neighbor. 28 4 Yet
even if neither of these harms are present, a strong argument exists
that the joyriding neighbor should still be liable. 28 5 Recent Internet
jurisprudence suggests that using another's computer equipment to
access the Internet results in a trespass to chattel, regardless of
whether that access results in actual harm.28 6 In an effort to thwart
the negative externality that joyriding causes ISPs and manufactur-
279. Assuming arguendo that these facts did exist, joyriding does not appear a reason-
able means for abating the nuisance. To be excused for an action of trespass, an
actor must reasonably believe that a demand on the chattel owner to cease the
nuisance would be impractical or useless. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 264, at 498
(1958). A more reasonable method of abatement would be for the neighbor simply
to request that the Wi-Fi operator either physically relocate or cease using any
one of the many wireless devices creating the shortage. Given that the Wi-Fi
operator prefers that the neighbor not joyride, the Wi-Fi operator would likely
acquiesce to such a request. This method of abatement-the simple request-
appears more reasonable than joyriding because it would not subject the Wi-Fi
operator to the potential harms discussed above. See discussion supra subsection
III.B.2.
280. See discussion supra section III.A.
281. See discussion supra subsection III.B.1.
282. See discussion supra subsection III.B.3.
283. See discussion supra subsection III.B.2.a.
284. See discussion supra subsection III.B.2.a.
285. See discussion supra subsection III.B.2.b.
286. See cases cited supra note 175.
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ers of Wi-Fi routers, courts would likely view the joyriding neighbor's
conduct as tortious. 28 7
A joyriding neighbor would not likely prevail in arguing defenses
against the trespass claim.28 8 One arguable defense is that the Wi-Fi
operator implicitly consents to the neighbor's conduct when the Wi-Fi
operator fails to implement security measures such as a password.289
Yet the fact that a Wi-Fi operator may not implement a password to
protect access to the network should not be interpreted as consent to
the neighbor's conduct. 2 90 The Wi-Fi operator's failure to implement
password protections is akin to any physical property owner failing to
secure his or her property with a lock.291 Failure to secure property
does not denote consent. 29 2 Nor does the fact that the Wi-Fi operator
places the network at risk of a neighbor accessing it imply that the
neighbor's act is excused. 29 3 Assumption of risk is no defense to an
intentional tort.29 4 It is also noteworthy that the Wi-Fi operator has
no economic incentive to allow the neighbor access to the network.2 9 5
In the absence of an economic benefit for the Wi-Fi operator, there is
no reason to presume that the Wi-Fi operator would condone
joyriding. 296
Another arguable defense is that joyriding is a permissible abate-
ment of an actionable nuisance. 29 7 That nuisance arguably consists of
the detriment that the wireless network causes to the neighbor's capa-
bility of setting up his or her own wireless network.2 98 This argument
would not likely succeed. 29 9 Nuisance claims arising from radio fre-
quency interference are preempted by federal law under the FCA, and
the FCA does not prohibit the interference that Wi-Fi radio signals
might cause on unlicensed frequencies. 30 0 Moreover, even if the FCA
did not preempt nuisance claims, abatement is permissible only where
harm actually occurs. 30 1 Actual harm would occur only if the joyrid-
ing neighbor had first attempted to access the Internet through his or
her own Wi-Fi connection, a situation which appears unlikely.3 0 2 The
287. See discussion supra subsection III.B.2.b.
288. See discussion supra Part IV.
289. See discussion supra section V.A.
290. See discussion supra section IV.A.
291. See discussion supra section IV.A.
292. See discussion supra section V.A.
293. See discussion supra section W.A.
294. See discussion supra section W.A.
295. See discussion supra section W.A.
296. See discussion supra section V.A.
297. See discussion supra section IV.B.
298. See discussion supra section 1V.B.
299. See discussion supra section IV.B.
300. See cases cited supra note 268.
301. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 89, at 635 (1998).
302. See discussion supra section I.B.
[Vol. 84:12261264
2006] PHYSICAL TRESPASS IN VIRTUAL REALITY 1265
joyriding neighbor would not likely prevail in arguing a defense to
trespass to chattel.
Thus, Wi-Fi technology appears to introduce a new stick into the
bundle of sticks that a Wi-Fi operator holds over physical property.
The Wi-Fi operator should be able to control the electronic signals that
are directed through his or her router. Likely an owner of an um-
brella, an automobile, or a football could not preclude another person
from causing electronic signals to contact their respective property.
Trespass to chattel in cyberspace thereby signifies a new sort of prop-
erty right, a right which emerged due to the value that the physical
property has brought to the virtual world. A Wi-Fi operator should
hold a unique property right in the router because of the router's capa-
bility of facilitating communication in cyberspace. For its virtual
value, a physical trespass to chattel should lie.
